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Living Outside the Law: How the Informal 
Economy Frustrates Enforcement of the Human 
Rights Regime for Billions of the World’s Most 
Marginalized Citizens 
Brett J. Miller* 
¶1 How is it possible that in a world of six and a half billion people, roughly four 
billion of them are living outside of the law, beyond the reach of many basic human 
rights protections?1  The answers are as complex and diverse as the vast number of 
people who make up the question, but the unifying connection lies in what has been 
called the “informal economy.”2  This article is a modest attempt to extend the work of 
development economists and legal scholars who have studied the informal economy to 
the issue of the human rights corpus.  The range of human rights implicated and the 
uniqueness found in each of the world’s extralegal sectors make this undertaking too 
immense to fully develop here.  Nevertheless, this article will proceed by broadly 
examining the informal phenomenon and its consequences, identifying the ways human 
rights are implicated, and finally offering proposals for moving forward.  It is impossible 
to bring every person and transaction into the formal sector.  3  Despite this challenge, the 
human rights community’s goal remains providing everyone with the protections of the 
human rights regime. 
¶2 This article will argue that for state actors to fulfill their responsibility to enforce 
human rights, they must build coherent legal regimes in functional market economies that 
bring the cost of formality below that of informality.  Additionally, international 
instruments must adequately provide for these rights and include reporting and 
enforcement mechanisms as a means to apply international pressure upon state violators.  
Only when state and international actors fulfill their respective duties will the human 
rights regime overcome the pitfalls of informality and provide those who seek such 
protection a means to afford, and incentive to freely choose, existence within the law.     
                                                 
 * J.D. candidate, May 2007, Northwestern University School of Law; B.B.A. Marketing and 
Management, University of Portland, May 2003.  The author would like to thank Prof. Michael Davis and 
Merlin Camozzi for their assistance in topic development.  Additionally, thanks go out to Matt Wernz for 
his assistance and contributions.  Finally, the author would like to thank and apologize to his family and 
friends who have had the misfortune of listening to longwinded, incoherent, rambling explanations of this 
project over the last year.   
 1 Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Home Page, at http://www.ild.org.pe/home.htm (last visited Apr. 
6, 2006). 
 2 Also referred to as the “extralegal,” “underground,” or “black-market” economy.  These terms will be 
used interchangeably throughout this article. 
 3 It would be impossible and inefficient to regulate every transaction, activity, and behavior.  A certain 
amount of illegality, moonlighting, corruption, and cash-based transactions is inevitable because the cost of 
preventing them is prohibitively expensive. 
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I. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
¶3 “The informal economy is . . . characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated 
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities 
are regulated.”4 
A. Activities 
¶4 The informal economy is comprised of activities ranging from the illegal to the 
ordinary, such as narcotics trafficking or professionals who moonlight for cash.  Much of 
the developing world’s informality surrounds activities and people within the labor, 
housing, and commercial sectors.  These informal sectors are characterized by an absence 
of legal licenses, titles, and regulatory supervision.  Residents in informal housing are 
essentially squatters, which makes eviction an ever-present threat.  Informal businesses 
operate without licenses and do not pay taxes.5  The more illicit side of informality 
involves the sex trade, drugs, slavery, sweatshops, money laundering, smuggling, the 
arms trade, and other various black-markets.  Additionally, worldwide there is a 
prevalence of work done outside of the formal legal regime, often by illegal immigrants, 
involving work in agriculture, domestic service, factories, restaurants and hotels.6  The 
tremendous breadth of informal activities helps explain the prominence of extralegal 
sectors. 
B. Location and Size 
¶5 The informal economy is present throughout the world.  The most prevalent 
extralegal sectors are found in the Third World and post-Communist States transitioning 
to market economies.7  In such developing and transitioning nations, 80% of the 
population exists as “informals.”8  Yet, informal sectors also exist in countries 
representing every stage of the development spectrum.  Thus, while the vast majority of 
informals are found in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and former Communist countries, the 
United States is also home to many who live or work outside of the formal sector.9   
¶6 Extralegal sectors vary in size dramatically from country to country, but estimates 
and examples will help gauge the scope of informal sectors relative to the economies in 
which they operate.  In Russia, the underground economy has been estimated to represent 
as much as 30-40% of all personal incomes10 and account for up to 50% of gross 
                                                 
 4 Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the 
Informal Economy , in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 12 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ. Press 1989). 
 5 See generally, HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]. 
 6 Free the Slaves, Washington, D.C., & the Human Rights Center of the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, 
Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2005). 
 7 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND 
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE? 15 (Basic Books, 2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL]. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for 
Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 65, 71 (1995). 
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domestic product (GDP).11  In other countries transitioning to market economies, the 
extralegal sector is also very large.  The informal economy comprises 50% of GDP in 
Ukraine, 62% in Georgia,12 and 80% of the total economy in Armenia.13  For non-
European Union immigrants moving to Italy, 62% will find their first job in the 
underground economy and 30% will remain there.14  In Africa, Zambia has only 10% of 
its entire workforce employed in the formal sector.15  This pattern persists in the Western 
Hemisphere where the International Labor Organization has estimated that 85% of new 
jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean are being created in the informal sector.16  
Taken altogether, the informal portion of the Latin American urban workforce grew from 
25.6% in 1980 to 31.9% in the 1990’s.17  By 1994, the informal sector had become the 
largest sector of urban employment in Latin America at 33.2%.18  The size of the informal 
economy in the United States is hard to determine because of its clandestine and 
persecuted nature.19  Yet, estimates from 1994 placed unreported income at $492 billion, 
representing 9.6% of all personal income and 8.1% of GDP in the United States.20   
C. Causes  
¶7 Extralegal sectors derive from a plethora of causes and unique local conditions.  
Nevertheless, some consistent circumstances are found around the world.  People may be 
driven into underground economies through bare necessity.  The legal regime of a 
country can be perfectly adequate, but immediate pressing need may lead an individual to 
engage in prostitution, 21 child labor, or narcotics trafficking.  While good governance is 
not immune to extralegality, the lack of such a system exacerbates the problem.  
Government corruption is present in all countries in varying degrees, but is especially 
prevalent in developing and transitioning economies, leading to thriving black-markets.22  
If the system is administered in a corrupt, incoherent, exorbitantly expensive, 
discriminatory or elitist manner, then many are forced into informality as the law does 
not protect them.   
                                                 
 11 See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 69. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Jack McMahon, A Year in Armenia, 43-DEC ADVOC. 19 (Dec. 2000). 
 14 Kitty Calavita, Law, Citizenship, and the Construction of (Some) Immigrant ‘Others’, 30 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 401, 413 (2005). 
 15 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 69. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Guillermo O’Donnell, Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Some Political Reflections, in 49 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES 50 (Victor E. Tokman & 
Guillermo O’Donnell eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998). 
 18 The other sectors analyzed were: small-enterprise at 22.5%, large and medium enterprise at 30.8% and 
public employment at 13.6%.  Carlos H. Filgueira, Welfare and Citizenship: Old and New Vulnerabilities, 
in 119 POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES, 131-32 (Victor E. 
Tokman & Guillermo O’Donnell eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998). 
 19 Castells and Portes, supra  note 4, at 20. 
 20 Morton Paglin, The Underground Economy: New Estimates from Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys, 103 YALE L.J. 2239, 2249 (1994). 
 21 Kelly Schwab, Comment, The Sexual Exploitation of Children: Suppressing the Global Demand and 
Domestic Options for Regulating Prostitution, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP . L. 333, 352 (2005). 
 22 Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People’s Republic of China and 
Attempts to Control It , 4 J. CHINESE L. 187, 192-93, 201, 204-05 (1990). 
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¶8 The written laws in countries with vast informal sectors are frequently not arcane, 
but the most modern and elegant legal systems in the world.23  When small extralegal 
sectors exist, the problem is one of law enforcement.  However, when forty to fifty 
percent of the population disobeys the law, as is the case in many developing and post-
Communist countries, the social efficiency of the law is the problem.24  Laws are socially 
efficient when accepted, observed, or used by a vast majority of the community to which 
they are directed;25 essentially, the law must reflect the heterogeneous social realities of 
its people.  The main difficulty in writing laws in the developing world is a lack of 
information.  Lawmakers often cope by borrowing the most modern comparative foreign 
laws, which may not be suitable for local circumstances.26  Therefore, whether a country 
has the best laws that money can buy or is adhering to laws illegitimately promulgated by 
de facto regimes, the result is a system of governance that drives people into informality 
based on its incoherence.27 
¶9 The history of development also offers consistent patterns leading to informality.  
Often, a largely agrarian society is quickly pushed into an industrial revolution, not 
altogether unlike the experience of the United States.28  Massive migration to cities 
results, facilitated by the construction of modern highways, perceived high standards of 
urban life, and various agricultural crises.29  Further rationales include migrants’ hopes of 
higher wages, better education, improved health services, and lower infant mortality. 30 
Urban areas are ill-equipped to support such swift growth and massive squatting ensues.31   
The result of which is often the promulgation of vagrancy laws that further enhance the 
illegality of such squatter populations.32  To survive in rapidly developing countries, 
migrants are often forced into informality. 33  
¶10 Immigration commonly leads to informality.  Often, immigrants must survive on 
the margins, without legal protections, because they are either illegal or invisible to the 
law for long periods after arrival. 34  Immigrants that seek asylum regularly toil through a 
long examination process that only infrequently leads to legal recognition. 35  Thus, many 
immigrants remain undocumented, surviving in the informal economy and facing the 
constant threat of deportation. 36  The “in transit” period for asylum seekers is one of 
“vulnerability, insecurity and socio-economic marginalization,” in which informals often 
                                                 
 23 John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 50, 51 
(1996). 
 24 This has been identified as the largest challenge facing Latin American legal systems.  Hon. Roberto 
G. MacLean, The Social Efficiency of Laws as an Element of Political and Economic Development, 4-SPR 
NAFTALBRA 6, 7 (1998). 
 25 Id. at 10. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.; Linarelli, supra note 23, at 52.  
 28 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 17-18, 149-50. 
 29 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 10-11; DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 17-18. 
 32  Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest 
Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 674-77 (2004). 
 33 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 11. 
 34 Aspasia Papadopoulou, Smuggling Into Europe: Transit Migrants In Greece, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 
167, 171, 175 (2004). 
 35 Id. at 171. 
 36 Id.  
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seek accommodation in refugee camps.37  Such restrictive immigration policies are not 
per se violations of human rights.  However, it is worth noting that their effect of pushing 
people into extralegal sectors, where they are identified as illegal aliens that lack rights 
and face deportation, undoubtedly leads to violations. 
¶11 Informal sectors will always be present to some degree, even in the most efficient 
economies.  Income will never be fully reported and unlawful behavior will persist.  It is 
preferable to have some extralegal norms and practices because, if nothing else, it avoids 
overly- invasive and inefficient regulatory schemes.  The pervasiveness of extralegal 
sectors in developing and transitional countries leads to the conclusion that their primary 
cause is the inability to establish a coherent and workable market system, governed by 
predictable and regularly enforced laws.  As will be shown in the following section, the 
result is that it simply costs less to exist outside of the law. 
D. The Costs of Formality v. Informality: Hernando De Soto and the Case of Peru 
¶12 Many noteworthy scholars have studied the informal economy, perhaps none more 
so than Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto and his think tank, the Institute for Liberty 
and Democracy (ILD).38  De Soto’s influential book, “The Other Path,” takes an in-depth 
look at informality in Peru, focusing on the incoherence and costs of the legal system as 
the primary factors pushing people into extralegal existence.  De Soto sees legal reform 
and specifically a formalized system of property rights as the answers to bringing people 
into the system.  Such legal recognition of property ownership combats poverty by 
allowing the poor to use the assets they already possess as a means to create capital.  The 
analysis of Peru in the late 1980’s has continued relevance because of its tremendous 
depth in detailing the cost differential between legal inclusion and exclusion.  Moreover, 
the problems chronicled are likely representative of those still existing in the developing 
world.  De Soto and his research team discovered that 48% of the economically active 
population and 61.2% of work hours were devoted to informal activities, making up 
38.9% of Peru’s GDP.39   
¶13 The costs of formality in Peru were staggering.  In an experiment to test the cost of 
access to industry, De Soto’s team followed all of the legally required steps and 
procedures to open a legal sewing business.40  This process took 289 days of bureaucratic 
procedures, eleven permits, and a total cost of $1231, or thirty-two times the monthly 
minimum living wage.41  Despite a desire to abide by all the legal rules, the applicants 
were still forced to pay two bribes in order to allow their permit requests to proceed.42  
Likewise, legally purchasing a piece of urban land for housing required an adjudication 
and numerous permits and certifications totaling a process of almost seven years, with 
almost five years of minimum wage being required for the adjudication alone.43  The cost 
of access to trade was equally exorbitant.  It took forty-three days and $590.56 (fifteen 
times the monthly minimum wage) to open a formal store and fourteen and a half years of 
                                                 
 37 Id. at 175. 
 38 MacLean, supra note 24, at 15.  
 39 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 12. 
 40 Id. at 134. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 136, 139. 
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waiting time to open a formal public market.44  Finally, the cost of access to public transit 
entailed a twenty-six month wait to obtain legal recognition for operating a minibus 
route.45  Once legality is achieved, dramatic costs remain to sustain formal legality.  De 
Soto’s team discovered that firms’ profits would be more than quadrupled without the 
substantial costs imposed by the administrative procedures to stay formal, which include 
endless streams of documents and an inflexible government staff. 46 
¶14 The exorbitant costs of formality are in no way unique to Peru.  It takes 168 
bureaucratic steps and thirteen to twenty-five years to formalize informal urban property 
in the Philippines.47  Gaining access to desert land and registering property rights for 
construction purposes takes between six and fourteen years in Egypt, which explains why 
4.7 million Egyptians have chosen to build their dwellings illegally.48  Finally, after 
leasing land for five years in Haiti, it requires 111 steps and 4112 days to complete a 
sales contract.49  Hence, the steep costs of formality are a pervasive phenomenon.   
¶15 Yet, there are also costs to informality.  In order to avoid penalties and detection, 
informal businesses must disperse employees, use less-visible workplaces, refrain from 
advertising, avoid certain marketplaces, bribe authorities, and keep scale small.50  Perhaps 
the largest cost is the inability to use one’s assets as collateral for credit, which denies 
funding and prohibits growth. 51  Further, informals incur inevitable net transfer costs.  De 
Soto found that informals transferred approximately thirteen percent of GDP to the 
formalized citizenry through taxes levied on inputs purchased, inflation costs incurred by 
an inability to use banks, and the steep interest rates charged in the informal credit 
market.52  Finally, there are various costs associated with the inability to easily transfer 
property, defending possessions, constant threats of eviction, inability to use the contract 
system, inefficiencies of extra-contractual law, lack of insurance, and the absence of 
means to share risk or protect innovation. 53  Thus, while the cost of formality in Peru was 
prohibitively high for most of the population, the informal alternative was not without 
considerable expense.  
¶16 De Soto and his ILD team actually had the opportunity to put many of their legal 
reforms into place in Peru and have been contracted by foreign governments to research 
and assist in similar government transformations.54  In Peru, the ILD helped implement 
approximately 400 new laws and managed one of the largest titling, or property-creation, 
projects ever employed.55  Although their projects were interrupted the results are 
significant.   Recording of real estate ownership dropped from over twelve years down to 
                                                 
 44 Id. at 143-44. 
 45 Id. at 146. 
 46 Id. at 151. 
 47 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
 48 Id. at 20, 24-25. 
 49 Id. at 26-27. 
 50 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 153. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 155-56. 
 53 Id. at 158-72; DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 83.   
 54 Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Origins of the ILD, at http://www.ild.org.pe/eng/history1.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006); Institute for Liberty and De mocracy, ILD In a Nutshell, at 
http://www.ild.org.pe/eng/contenido.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).  
 55 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM, at xxiii (Basic 
Books 2002) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE ECONOMIC ANSWER]. 
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one month at 1% of the previous cost. 56  By 2000, 1.9 million urban buildings 
representing 75% of the extralegal market were legalized.57  Beginning a legal business 
went from around 300 days to one.58  Finally, Peru’s participation in the international 
cocaine market declined.59  All of these reforms and administrative simplifications led to 
very high economic growth rates, including the worlds highest at 12% in 1994.60 
¶17 The Peruvian case study about the costs of formality and potential for reform is 
dramatic.  However, this is not to say that the informal economy has a one-size fits all 
remedy.   The work of De Soto, the ILD, and other scholars merely serves to illustrate the 
depth, costs, and challenges posed by extralegal sectors as we turn to the effects of 
informality on human rights. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATED 
¶18 Studies of the informal economy have made a reasonably comprehensive 
examination of informality’s effects upon property and development rights, which will be 
analyzed within.  This section will also focus upon the informal economy as an 
impediment to fulfilling nearly every significant human right including, inter alia, rights 
regarding: political participation, judicial remedies, protection from arbitrary or unlawful 
inference and attack, equal protection, slavery, freedom of movement, access to services, 
adequate standards of living, women’s and children’s rights, social security, education, 
and marriage.  Because research in many of these areas has yet to be taken up or is 
inadequate, this section will necessarily remain theoretical and broad.  The goals here are 
to analyze what is known, ask the right questions, and draw reasonable inferences.  As an 
initial matter, this analysis is not aimed at the extralegal activities of, for example, a 
mechanic who moonlights for cash, but rather the large portion of the informal sector 
made up of those that the law effectively forces into informality.  
A. Development and Property Rights 
1. Right to Development 
¶19 The right to development is rooted in the United Nations Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Human Rights Conventions.61  
According to the Declaration on the Right to Development: 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be 
fully realized.   
                                                 
 56 Id. at xxvi-xxviii. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at xxvi-xxviii. 
 60 Id. at xxvii. 
 61 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Development: 
Background, at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right-01.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
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2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the 
relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the 
exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural 
wealth and resources.62 
Both individuals and peoples can invoke the right to development, which imposes duties 
of promoting fair development and effective international cooperation upon both 
individual states and the international community. 63 
¶20 Does informality frustrate the right of individual development?  The answer appears 
to be a resounding yes.  Informality perpetuates poverty by removing the protections of 
the legal regime from the poor, denying them the ability to use their assets as capital, and 
ultimately foreclosing the opportunity to create wealth. 64  This undoubtedly violates their 
inalienable rights to contribute to economic development, self-determination, and to 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, as called for in the Declaration.  
Further, because informals effectively have no interaction with the State unless they 
commit a serious crime,65 they are not able to exercise their right to participate in and 
contribute to political development.    
¶21 Informality also frustrates the right to development as a people.  The global poor 
own an estimated $9.3 trillion in dead capital. 66  These are assets that cannot be used to 
their fullest in creating wealth. 67  Dead capital includes untitled property, unregistered 
businesses, and dwellings that could be seized at any time.68  Developing nations are 
made to depend upon foreign aid, which is wildly insufficient and unnecessary if only 
this dead capital could be utilized.69  For example, the dead capital of the poor in Egypt is 
worth fifty-five times as much as the sum of all direct foreign investment ever recorded 
there, including construction of the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam. 70  Haiti is the 
poorest nation in Latin America, yet the poor have assets worth more than 150 times 
greater than all foreign investment received since their independence in 1804.71  As the 
richest country on Earth, it would take the United States more than 150 years to transfer 
to the world’s poor the resources they already possess if we were to increase foreign-aid 
to the United Nations’ recommended level. 72  Informality is denying entire peoples their 
                                                 
 62 Declaration on the Right to Development art. 1, paras. 1, 2, G.A. Res. 41/128 (1986), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
 63 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Development: The 
Content of the Right to Development, at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right-02.html (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2006). 
 64 Interview by Dario Fernandez-Morera  with Hernando De Soto, REASON ONLINE MAGAZINE, available 
at http://reason.com/DeSoto.shtml  (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 65 Claudia Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption As Seen From the Brazilian Favelas, 36 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 397, 401 (2002). 
 66 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 35. 
 67 Hernando De Soto, Citadels of Dead Capital: What the Third World must learn from U.S. history, 
REASON ONLINE MAGAZINE, (May 2001), available at http://www.reason.com/0105/fe.hs.citadels.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
 68 See generally, DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 5. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. 
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right to development by keeping them from participating in economic development, 
infringing self-determination through unnecessary foreign involvement, and denying 
sovereignty over their resources. 
2. Property Rights 
¶22 Property rights and human rights share a tense yet inseparable history.  Scholars 
have noted that formal property rights and libertarian autonomy conflict with human 
rights provisions relying upon government action. 73  Property rights are a “negative” right 
of non- interference that strongly emphasizes the protection of individual liberty. 74  The 
human rights regime incorporates property rights and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that: “[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others.”75  And “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”76 
¶23 It is clear that informals who lack access to a formalized system of property 
ownership are denied their rights from the Declaration to legally own their property.  
Constant threats of arbitrary eviction further infringe these rights.  The right to resell 
property in a formalized recording system protects and enhances property rights, allows 
assets to be fungible, and provides security to transactions.77  These benefits of the 
formalized system are not available to informals, who are generally forced to transfer 
property by means of extralegal social contracts.78  Sales are effectively restricted to 
acquaintances in the informal economy and occur at greatly market-reduced prices.79 
¶24 The informal economy’s denial of property rights is arguably its most significant 
deprivation of human rights because many of the other rights discussed, such as political 
rights, social services, and education, often depend upon property ownership.  Further, 
the extralegal sectors denial of property rights is bad policy that perpetuates poverty 
through impeding the transformation of assets into capital.  Moreover, there is no 
incentive to improve property when it can be taken at any time.  The adverse 
ramifications of this problem are exemplified by narcotics producers who lack incentives 
to invest in legal crops that take longer to grow, but yield higher profits.80  
¶25 The informal economy is a large impediment to the attainment of development and 
property rights, but hope remains.  De Soto points out that the current industrial 
revolution in the Third World and post-Communist countries is moving at a much faster 
pace and involving more people than its Western predecessor.81  The lesson he draws 
from the experience of the West, is that stopgap solutions were not enough. 82  Instead, 
                                                 
 73 Robin Paul Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights—The Need for Moral Judgment in 
an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST . L.J. 163-65 (1986). 
 74 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS, 363 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
 75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, para. 1, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
 76 Id. art. 17, para. 2. 
 77 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 56-62. 
 78 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 163.  
 79 Id. at 160, 166. 
 80 Fernandez-Morera, supra note 62. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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legal reform and formal property systems were needed to raise the standard of living.83  
Thus, while the extralegal sector is a human rights concern, it can also be the answer to 
attaining development and empowerment through reform that brings dead capital assets 
within the legal system.  84 
B. Civil and Political Rights 
1. Political Participation 
¶26 Political participation as a human right is found in both article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration, 85 and more significantly, article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The latter states:  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without . . . 
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors . . . .86 
¶27 Political participation and the extralegal sectors of the developing and post-
Communist world seem to be conceptually incompatible.  The ICCPR promises 
“citizens” the right and the opportunity to participate, but how many informals are 
bestowed with the rights of full citizenship?  Sometimes they are literally not citizens and 
other times they are practically not able to participate as citizens.  The Covenant assures a 
freedom of participation without “unreasonable restrictions.”  The wholesale exclusion of 
the informals from the formal legal regime must necessarily qualify as such an 
unreasonable restriction.  Moreover, voting itself seems to be an unlikely occurrence.  
Those living in informal housing are usually squatting and may not have a recognized 
address or the proper documentation required for registered voting.  One study found that 
in Brazilian “lawless zones” most workers had no Social Security numbers, no identity 
documents, and no voter registration cards.87  For these reasons, many of those who exist 
within the extralegal economy are undoubtedly precluded from political participation.   
¶28 Voting, even where it takes place, may be both a less responsible and effective form 
of political participation for informals.  Most informals do not pay taxes because their 
jobs are not legally recognized, therefore if they are voting, they may be doing so 
irresponsibly because they will not have to pay for the decisions they make.  
Representation without taxation may be a way of leveling an unequal society, but perhaps 
not one that encourages fiscal responsibility.  Further, while groups such as students, 
                                                 
 83 Id. 
 84 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 71-73. 
 85 Stating: “(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”  Universal Declaration, supra note 75, art. 21, 
para. 3. 
 86 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, subpara. a, b, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICCPR].  
 87 Fonseca, supra  note 65, at 401.   
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retirees, and the disabled are generally allowed to participate despite their vastly reduced 
tax-burden, they are still treated as important segments of the electorate based upon their 
numbers, organization, and the expectation that they financially contribute at some point.  
This influence is a stark contrast from the informals who are outcast and ignored.   Under 
these conditions, informality effectively denies the human right of political participation, 
regardless of whether or not voting occurs.     
2. Effective Judicial Remedies 
¶29 Problems of government inefficiencies, corruption, and irrational legal regimes are 
discussed throughout this article.  While the political branches of many developing and 
transitioning nations have exacerbated the problem of informality, judicial branches have 
faired no better.  The World Bank has recognized that “[u]nreliable judiciaries hinder 
development, discourage and distort trade, and foster corruption.”88  An effective legal 
system and an independent, respected judiciary are necessary to assist in the transition to 
free markets.89  Despite the obvious importance of universal judicial access, informals are 
the least likely to use the formal judicial system, but most in need of legal protection. 90 
¶30 Article 2 of the ICCPR echoes and expands upon article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration by declaring that:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity;  
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;  
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies 
when granted.91 
¶31 Yet, how can an “effective remedy” be guaranteed without access to the judiciary?  
Further, how can the guarantee of “enforcement” be carried out when the “competent 
authorities” are the same ones who exclude, discriminate against, and ignore the 
informals?  The skepticism in these questions is supported by public perceptions in 
                                                 
 88 Robert M. Kossick, Jr. & Marcelo Bergman, The Enforcement of Local Judgments in Mexico: An 
Analysis of the Quantitative & Qualitative Perceptions of the Judiciary & Legal Profession, 34 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 435, 457 (2003). 
 89 McGrory, supra note 10, at 96. 
 90 The number of households using the formal judicial system is significantly higher in titled 
communities versus informal communities.  Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and 
Household Time Allocation in Urban Squatter Communities: Evidence From Peru , 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 837, 842 (2004). 
 91 ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 2, para. 3. 
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developing countries of an elitist, arbitrary judiciary92 that is corrupt and inefficient.93  
Further, there is a consensus that judgments do not reconcile the law with social realities94 
and that unjust application of law by courts has become only graver as the pressures that 
lead to informality continue.95 
¶32 The informal sector has responded by developing an informal jurisprudence out of 
the need for a dispute resolution mechanism.  This has been called “dynamic” 
jurisprudence and it gives informals a set of non-static legal norms to apply.96  For 
example, “invasion contracts” bind informals together when taking over land for 
settlement.97  While these judicial mechanisms can be relatively effective for some 
matters, such as disputes between informals, they are not an effective means of ensuring 
that the state is living up to its human rights obligations.  In such cases, a formalized 
judiciary is essential. 
¶33 Many countries with large informal economies have very weak and ineffective 
judicial systems.98  The informal economy is likely perpetuated because people neither 
trust the courts nor can afford to bring their suits.  Further, it is probably often the case 
that informals cannot bring claims due to the illegality of their actions.  For these reasons, 
informals are forced to deal with disputes themselves.  Thus, broadly, one more important 
actor in the protection of human rights is not fulfilling its role, and more narrowly, the 
human right of access to effective judicial remedies is denied. 
3. Protection from Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference and Attacks 
¶34 Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.  2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks.”99 
¶35 The informal sector is problematic for the enforcement of this human right for two 
significant reasons.  First, those who live in informal housing may be subject to arbitrary 
interference with their homes at any time.  Because informals are forced into squa tting, 
they have no formal protection against invasions of their dwellings.  Second, protection 
of the law is not provided for most informals.  Often, the police either ignore or are afraid 
to enter extralegal zones.100  Thus, law enforcement provides little or no protection.  
Assuming that the police do respond, they may only exacerbate the problem for 
informals.  For example, the police in Thailand often simply return enslaved prostitutes 
who run away to their owners.101  Perhaps worse, corrupt police may prey further upon 
the victim.  Under such circumstances it would not be surprising if such victims choose 
                                                 
 92 Linarelli, supra note 23, at 69. 
 93 Kossick & Bergman, supra note 88, at 457. 
 94 Linare lli, supra note 23, at 61. 
 95 Id. at 52. 
 96 Arthur J. Jacobson, The Informal Economy: The Other Path of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2213, 2214 
(1994). 
 97 Id. at 2228. 
 98 Linarelli, supra note 23, at 61-71. 
 99 ICCPR, supra note 86, at art. 17. 
 100 Fonseca, supra  note 65, at 401. 
 101 A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic and 
Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN ST . INT’L L. REV. 809, 820 (2005). 
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not to avail themselves of formal protection.  Moreover, the legal protections of the 
judiciary are generally not available to informals.  For all of these reasons, informality 
frustrates the realization of the human right of protection from arbitrary or unlawful 
interference and attacks. 
4. Equal Protection 
¶36 Article 26 of the ICCPR echoes and expands upon the article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration by stating:  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.102 
¶37 The human right of equal protection of the law as effective protection against 
discrimination on the ground of “other status” is noteworthy.  Informality is certainly a 
distinguishable social status that leads to substantial legal discrimination.  This “other 
status” discrimination is evident from the aforementioned lack of police protection for 
informals, the way the law removes this entire class of people from the formal regime, 
and the unequal access to and treatment within the judicial system.  In much of the world, 
the legal treatment of informals is to exclude and ignore them; this is a far cry from 
achieving the human right of equal protection before the law. 
5. Slavery 
¶38 The popular conception that slavery has ended, or been nearly eradicated, is a 
myth. 103  Slavery in its various forms, including chattel slavery, is still found in alarming 
numbers in countries representing all stages of development.104  ICCPR article 8 provides 
that: “1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms 
shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude. 3. (a) No one shall be required to 
perform forced or compulsory labour . . . .”105  Today, at least twenty-seven million 
people around the globe are performing forced labor, without pay, under the threat of 
violence.106   
¶39 Working conditions in formal sectors exist that represent something very close to de 
facto slavery, especially for women pushed into semi- and no-skill jobs, subject to 
inhumane conditions, low-wages, and physical and sexual abuse.107  Not surprisingly, 
modern slavery is a problem whose prevalence is associated with the informal economy.  
                                                 
 102 ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 26; Universal Declaration, supra note 73, art. 7. 
 103 iAbolish: American Anti-Slavery Group, Modern Slavery 101, at 
http://www.iabolish.com/slavery_today/primer/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). 
 104 Id. 
 105 ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 8. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Rassam, supra  note 101, at 826. 
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Examples include full chattel slavery, domestic housekeeping, sweatshop work, sex 
trafficking, debt bondage, restaurant/hotel work, and forced agricultural labor.108  These 
indisputable violations of the human right to be free from slavery are clearly fueled by 
the existence of extralegal sectors.  While the informal economy allows slavery to 
survive, the presence of over 10,000 forced laborers in the United States demonstrates 
that this is not merely a problem for the developing and transitioning worlds.109  Thus, 
much like other illegal activities such as drugs, weapons, and prostitution, slavery is 
unlikely to be remedied by legal reform alone. 
6. Freedom of Movement 
¶40 The Universal Declaration guarantees that: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State.”110  This freedom of movement 
can be directly denied to informals through vagrancy laws, migration-control systems 
such as the Chinese hukou system, 111 and other restrictions that limit ones ability to live 
in a city or region of their choice.  Movement is also constrained indirectly by the denial 
of property rights, which often forces informals to remain on their property in order to 
guard it from invasion by the State or other informals.112  Thus, the Universal Declaration 
is again effectively thwarted.  
C. Economic and Social Rights 
¶41 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration broadly sets out many of the human rights 
to which we now turn.  
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.   
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.113 
1. Access to Services 
¶42 The Universal Declaration’s article 21 states that: “[e]veryone has the right to equal 
access to public service in his country.”114  Even if the State was willing to provide 
services to informals, their inability to keep tabs on people existing outside of the legal 
regime effectively precludes them from doing so.  The fact that urban informals have 
almost no contact with the State, unless they commit a serious crime, underscores their 
                                                 
 108 Free the Slaves, supra note 6, at 48; iAbolish, supra note 103. 
 109 Free the Slaves, supra note 6, at 47. 
 110 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, art. 13, para. 1. 
 111 Xin Frank He, Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants in Beijing: Institutional Conflict and Ineffective 
Campaigns, 39 STAN. J. INT 'L L. 177-78 (2003). 
 112 Field, supra  note 90, at 838-39. 
 113 Universal Declaration, supra note 75, art. 25. 
 114 Id. art. 21, para. 2. 
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deprivation of services.115  If even the police avoid informal settlements, then it can come 
as no surprise that social services rarely visit such dwellings either.116 
¶43 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
article 12 recognizes the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.”117  Yet, health care is another issue that is 
problematic with informality.  Informal housing settlements often lack adequate 
infrastructure to provide proper sanitation, clean water, sewage treatment, etc.118  These 
inadequacies create a host of health problems that are aggravated by the lack of 
government-sponsored social services available.  Yet, informality is not entirely a victim, 
as it also intensifies this problem.  For example, assuming other political obstacles could 
be overcome, the attainment of universal health coverage remains frustrated by the 
tremendous tax evasions of the informal economy, which impedes the mobilization of 
resources necessary to finance such a system. 119  Therefore, both the State’s treatment of 
informals and the consequences of informality itself, jointly deny the human right of 
equal access to public services. 
2. Adequate Standard of Living 
¶44 ICESCR article 11 sets out a series of recognized rights that make up the guarantee 
of an adequate standard of living.  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living fo r himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.  
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, the measures, including specific 
programmes, which are needed:  
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of 
food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing 
or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most 
efficient development and utilization of natural resources;  
                                                 
 115 Fonseca, supra note 65, at 401. 
 116 “[I]t was a rare day when the teachers or health officers entered anyone’s home.”  Id. 
 117 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 12, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 118 Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban Poverty in Developing 
Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109, 1123-24 (2004). 
 119 Konstantina Davaki & Elias Mossialos, Plus CA Change: Health Sector Reforms in Greece, 30 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 143, 146 (2005). 
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(b) Taking into account the problems of both food- importing and food-
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need.120 
¶45 The attainment of the provisions for adequate food and clothing are difficult to 
measure.  Yet, the fact that informal housing conditions are linked with a woefully 
inadequate supply of basic services, including clean drinking water,121 and are primary 
causes of many injuries, psychological stresses, and both communicable and chronic 
diseases,122 indicates that there is work to be done here. 
¶46 At least one billion people lack appropriate housing and billions more live in 
informal settlements under various degrees of livability.123  Conditions in Third World 
cities have conspired to force people into informal housing based upon the rapid rural-
urban migration, overall population growth, lack of funds, and lack of reasonably priced 
housing.124  In a study of informal housing in Egyptian cities, it was discovered that these 
conditions have led to fifty-four percent of all housing units being informal. 125  Greater 
Cairo alone had approximately sixty-eight informal settlements occupied by more than 
11.39 million occupants.126  The United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat) 
has recognized that “neither squatter settlement upgrading, nor sites and services projects 
in their present form provide a long-term answer to the problems of accommodating the 
growing numbers of urban poor at decent standards.  As conceived at present, they will 
not be able to guarantee that very large numbers of people will be able to satisfy their 
basic rights with respect to shelter.”127 
¶47 Because migrants and the poor are forced into informal housing settlements that 
lack the necessary infrastructure to guarantee safe, sanitary living conditions, the human 
right of attaining an adequate standard of living is not being realized by billions in the 
informal sector.  
3. Women’s Rights 
¶48 The human rights regime aims to ensure equal rights for women, 128 while also 
recognizing motherhood should be accorded special protections.129  The Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the only 
human rights treaty that affirms the reproductive rights of women. 130  ICESCR article 10 
                                                 
 120 ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 11. 
 121 Atuahene, supra note 118, at 1123. 
 122 AHMED M. SOLIMAN, A POSSIBLE WAY OUT : FORMALIZING HOUSING INFORMALITY IN EGYPTIAN 
CITIES, 15 (Univ. Press of America 2004). 
 123 SOLIMAN, supra note 122, at xiii. 
 124 Id. at 9. 
 125 Id. at 31. 
 126 Id. at 25. 
 127 Id. at 19. 
 128 ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 3. 
 129 Id. art. 10, para. 2; Universal Declaration, supra note 75, art. 25, para. 2. 
 130 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 11, para. F, 
available at  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) 
[hereinafter CEDAW]. 
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goes on to accord pregnant mothers “paid leave or leave with adequate social security 
benefits.”131  Such rights are not found in the informal economy. 
¶49 The various human rights instruments establish women’s rights to socioeconomic 
mobility and opportunity through education and employment.132  However, the informal 
economy is a barrier to the attainment of this opportunity and it particularly affects 
minority, immigrant, and indigenous women whose informal employment offers lower 
levels of labor protections than the mainstream economy. 133  
¶50 CEDAW additionally ensures that: “States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation 
of prostitution of women.”134  Yet, such activities are prevalent and the informal economy 
is where they exist.   
¶51 While the great bulk of scholarship rests on the notion that informality is harmful to 
women135, under some circumstances informality can be relatively advantageous.  Hunter 
R. Clark has argued that the expansion of the informal economy throughout Africa has 
benefited women because it allows them to avoid discriminatory regulation affecting 
licenses, loans, and accounting that have been called a primary “mechanism of male 
control over women.”136  This argument is not without merit, yet it is clear that by and 
large women are especially vulnerable to the informal economy’s consequences of 
malnutrition, hunger, poor health, 137 economic exploitation, and physical violence.138  For 
these reasons, extralegality remains very problematic to achieving women rights.   
4. Children’s Rights 
¶52 The need for special protections for those under the age of 18 is recognized in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and ICESCR.  The human rights identified 
in the CRC as being possessed by all children include: “the right to survival; to develop 
to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to 
participate fully in family, cultural and social life.”139  To these ends, the CRC goes on to 
include a host of rights that individual government signatories are responsible for 
promoting,140 providing,141 respecting,142 and protecting.143  It comes as no surprise that 
                                                 
 131 ICESCR, supra note 117, art. 10, para 2. 
 132 Catherine Powell & Jennifer H. Lee, Comment, Recognizing the Interdependence of Rights in the 
Antidiscrimination Context Through the World Conference Against Racism, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
235, 251 (2002). 
 133 Id. at 251-52. 
 134 CEDAW, supra note 130, art. 6. 
 135 See e.g., Nandini Gunewardena, Reinscribing Subalternity: International Financial Institutions, 
Development, and Women’s Marginality, 7 UCLA  J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 201 (2002-2003). 
 136 Hunter R. Clark, African “Renaissance” and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA . J. INT’L & COMP . L. 265, 282 
(1999). 
 137 Gunewardena, supra note 135, at 221. 
 138 Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and the Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP . L. REV. 47, 109 (1998). 
 139 The United Nations Children’s Fund, Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at  
http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CRC]; See also  ICESCR, supra note 117, 
art. 10. 
 140 The government is responsible for promoting: survival and development (art. 6); and the best 
interests of the child (art. 21).  CRC, supra note 139. 
 141 The government is responsible for providing: protection and care (art. 3); access to information (art. 
17); health care (art. 24); social security (art. 26); and an adequate standard of living (art. 27).  Id. 
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these noble ambitions are not realized for the young informals whose existence often 
includes child labor, prostitution, slavery, trafficking, street living, begging, stealing, and 
a host of health problems.144  Further, CRC article 16 protects children from arbitrary 
interferences with their home and guarantees the right to legal protection against such 
actions.  Yet, for the vast number of people without formal property ownership, this right 
can be infringed at any moment.145  The objectives of both the CRC and ICESCR to 
protect and assist children cannot be accomplished when children live in extralegality.  
5. Education 
¶53 The right to education is recognized in article 26 of the Universal Declaration, 
ICESCR article 13, and CRC articles 28 and 29.  These instruments call for a broad right 
that includes: compulsory education (available free to all), availability of secondary 
education (including technical and vocational), equal access to higher education, 
progressive introduction of free education at the secondary and higher levels, 
development of the human personality and sense of dignity, development of school 
systems, strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, furtherance 
and maintenance of peace, and promotion of understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all peoples.146 
¶54 The informal economy presents abundant challenges to the provision of public 
education.  Potential difficulties consist of: enrollment without a recognized home 
address, language barriers, exclusion of children not living in their state-mandated area,147 
and concern that enrollment will expose the family’s illegal status.  Another large 
obstacle to fully attaining this right is the prevalence of child labor in the developing 
world.  Even if the child attends school in addition to working, evidence shows that the 
education suffers based on the child’s fatigue and lack of time for schoolwork, recreation, 
and rest.148  Compulsory education must also combat the skepticism of its worth in 
informal sectors where the curricula may be viewed as unpractical, the costs of uniforms 
and books as prohibitive, and the schedule as unaccommodating. 149  While informal 
sectors are not always utterly denied the recognized human right to education, as they 
may be with other human rights, it is apparent that informality presents numerous 
impediments to the full and consistent realization of this right. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 142 The government will respect: freedom of expression (art. 13); freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (art. 14); and freedom of association (art. 15). Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Id. 
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6. Labor Conditions 
¶55 Article 7 of the ICESCR broadly sets forth the recognized rights regarding labor 
conditions. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, 
in particular:  
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:  
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions 
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal 
work;  
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with 
the provisions of the present Covenant;  
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;  
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to 
an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those 
of seniority and competence;  
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.150 
¶56 ICESCR article 8 goes further to guarantee the right to form and join trade 
unions.151  As with many of the previous human rights analyzed, the guarantees regarding 
safe working conditions, fair wages, equal opportunity, paid holidays, trade unions, etc., 
are generally not realities for workers in the informal economy.  These guarantees are 
meaningless because of the types of jobs that exist within the informal economy, such as 
street vending, drug dealing, prostitution, and sweatshop labor.  By delving deeper into 
some of these extralegal jobs and the labor conditions surrounding them, we can better 
examine the rights violations present.  
¶57 Sweatshop labor continues to be a sad reality of modern production that 
disproportionately victimizes women, who are essentially hidden from the outside world, 
leading to little concern for their denials of basic human rights.152  The working 
conditions that define such labor are: remuneration below the minimum wage, extra- long 
work shifts without overtime pay, harassment/abuse by supervisors, demands for sexual 
favors, arbitrary punishments or firings, physical violence, restrictions upon restroom use, 
                                                 
 150 ICESCR, supra note117, art. 7. 
 151 Id. art. 8.  
 152 Alison A. Gormley, Note, The Underground Exposed: The United States Corporations’ Use of 
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retaliation for complaints, hazardous conditions, overcrowding, and a lack of insurance, 
paid holidays, vacations, sick days, job security, maternity leave, and breaks.153  That 
such conditions violate the human rights of labor standards requires no analysis and could 
often be accurately equated with slavery, examined supra.154   
¶58 Sweatshops are usually found in areas immersed in repression and fear;155 hallmarks 
of incoherent legal regimes and their corresponding informal economies.  The prevalence 
of sweatshop conditions is likely driven by both large corporations and the host countries 
in which they manufacture.  Corporations seek to maximize profits through 
manufacturing in countries desperate for development.  To avoid discouraging foreign 
investment, these countries neither enforce many regulations nor punish violators.156  
Both the U.N. and I.L.O. have attempted to address the human rights violations of 
sweatshops,157 but their efforts are frustrated by the core question posed by this paper: 
how do we provide any type of human rights to those in the informal economy?    
¶59 The sex trade generally exists within the informal economy.  While men, women, 
and children all work in this sector, it is women who are most often forced into such work 
based upon desperation and lack of employment alternatives in the formal economy.158  
While sex trade employment against ones will or out of necessity is egregious in and of 
itself, it is the accompanying abuses that are particularly concerning from a human rights 
standpoint.  Sex workers routinely face arrest, police violence, extortion, assault, rape, 
loss of child custody, robbery, humiliation, harassment, murder, and discrimination in 
housing, employment and law enforcement.159  Moreover, these informals are often the 
victims of trafficking and fo rced prostitution. 160  Both the general illegality of such work 
and the frequent abuse of workers by the police or State, leads to fear amongst sex 
workers in reporting violations of their rights.161  Thus, the informal economy creates and 
perpetuates the human rights violations found in the sex trade.   
¶60 In addition, the prevalence and conditions of child labor are human rights violations 
found in the informal economy, as previously discussed generally and specifically as 
affecting education. 162 
¶61 Despite the existence of horrific extralegal working conditions, it is the manner by 
which people enter such employment that is often most disturbing.  According to the U.S. 
State Department’s 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report, there are between 14,500 and 
17,500 people trafficked into the United States annually, largely as an extreme abuse of 
foreign migrant labor.163  Globally, an estimated two to four million people are trafficked 
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annually.164  The informal economy is where these forms of modern slavery, sweatshops, 
and child labor are found.  
¶62 The United States presents an interesting case in extralegality because it is a country 
that has an arguably good record in providing human rights and coherent legal regulation 
to its citizens.  However, with so many people being trafficked into the United States 
every year, it may surprise many that the United States, despite its rule of law heritage, 
also has a significant informal economy.  The United States has its own problem with 
sweatshops and labor conditions, as found Los Angeles’s garment industry. 165  Also, 
prostitution, drug dealing, and forced domestic or manufacturing labor all add to the 
unseemly side of the U.S. extralegal sector.  Yet, perhaps some amount of informality is 
desirable, given the existence of imperfect legislation and unfortunate social realities.  
Moonlighting, street vending, and undocumented construction or agricultural labor may 
be arguably beneficial in providing desired services, sometimes in jobs Americans are 
unwilling to take, at prices that benefit consumers.  Also, the informal economy is 
perhaps the most important element of the economy on Native American Reservations.166  
It has even been argued that U.S. drug dealers have been able to find more respect, better 
wages, and better labor conditions by leaving the formal economy where they were 
exploited by abusive and often racist employers.167  The sad reality of this claim is likely 
true, yet such drug dealing perpetuates as many, if not more, destructive social realities as 
it alleviates.  Thus, while a small amount of certain informal activities do not necessarily 
present obvious human rights concerns and in fact may alleviate some immediate social 
inequities, it remains in the long-term best interests of everyone to attain legal inclusion 
and the corresponding protection of their rights.   
¶63 As with other rights discussed, the informal economy is not just the location of 
labor rights abuses, but also an enabler of the problem.  Because anyone can seize 
informally possessed property, informals are often unable to leave their property to seek 
out adequate formal sector employment.  In countries where property rights have been 
solidified and the economy has been formalized, there have been large increases in 
people seeking jobs outside of the home.168  Freedom from guarding ones property has 
positive effects including increased wages and productivity, and reductions in child labor 
and illegal drug manufacturing.169  Thus, extralegality itself frustrates the enforcement of 
human rights. 
¶64 The problem of enforcing human rights regarding labor conditions in the informal 
economy is difficult, if not impossible, as these workers lack the formal working status 
necessary to claim their rights under national legislation. 170   
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7. Social Security 
¶65 ICESCR article 9 provides that: “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”171  For the 
majority of informals, the attainment of this human right is impossible.  Informals do not 
pay taxes and often receive very little, if any, government services.  Third World 
governments rarely provide adequate levels of infrastructure to informal settlements to 
guard against immediate health problems, much less providing funds for long-term social 
insurance.172  The concept of a human right to social security must seem absurd to the 
many informals who live without sewage treatment, clean water, and other vital 
government services. 
8. Marriage and the Maintenance of the Family 
¶66 There is a recognized human right to willfully enter into a legal marriage.  Article 
16 of the Universal Declaration states that: “[m]en and women of full age, without any 
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution.”173  ICCPR article 23 goes on to guarantee: “1. The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.  2. 
The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be 
recognized.”174  
¶67 In informal sectors, people are often removed from any contact with the State.  It 
has been reported that in a Brazilian “lawless zone” at least seventy-five percent of adult 
couples with children were not legally married.175  It is reasonable that people who spend 
much time and energy eluding detection by the State would similarly see it as necessary 
to avoid registering and legalizing their marital unions.  Also, just as the bureaucratic red 
tape required to secure titles and licenses can be prohibitive to an existence within the 
law, the administrative procedures to procure a marriage license can be prohibitive to 
seeking one out.176   
¶68 The destructive effects of informality are likely felt within formal marriages as well 
because families may be broken up as spouses travel from rural areas to urban centers for 
work.  In sum, the delays, fears, disincentives, and familial strains caused by informality 
create a significant impediment to exercising the human rights of legal marriage and the 
maintenance of a family. 
D. Note on Terrorism 
¶69 Not all human rights issues involving extralegality fit neatly into the 
aforementioned categories of rights.  Terrorism presents just such a case. 
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1. Right to Security 
¶70 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration proclaims “the right to life, liberty and 
security of person;” a right essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.177  Terrorism is a 
threat to security and as such the United Nations has adopted a host of treaties aimed at 
combating and eradicating international terrorism. 178 
¶71 Hernando De Soto’s seminal book, “The Other Path,” was written to show an 
alternative to the teachings of a Maoist terror organization in Peru called “The Shining 
Path.”179  This group paralyzed the judicial system, threatened judges, freed prisoners, 
displaced over two million Peruvians from their homes, sent another one million into 
voluntary exile, executed, tortured, scalped, and took control of much of Peru’s coca-
growing. 180  When the Shining Path were eventually defeated, some of the credit went to 
the influence of “The Other Path.”181  Regardless of who or what deserves credit, De Soto 
has some compelling thoughts on the linkage between informality and terror.  
“[T]errorists . . . will always be around to champion the cause of the excluded.”182  
“People don’t rebel because they are poor but because they are excluded from the system. 
To give people a stake in the economy, to prove to them that government is in the 
business of including them in formal society, is to put the terrorists out of business.”183   
¶72 Today, terrorism is an ever-present threat and many protective measures have been 
employed that conflict with human rights and liberties.184  However, as “The Other Path” 
demonstrates, both security and human rights enforcement can simultaneously be 
obtained by promoting universal inclusion within the legal regime.  This method of 
guarding against terror, while increasing human rights protections, is particularly 
attractive when alternatives include violence and greater infringements upon rights.   
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
¶73 Each informal sector possesses idiosyncrasies, based upon local circumstances and 
traditions, which make a one-size-fits-all solution inappropriate.  However, there are 
some recognized approaches to battling extralegality that have either experienced success 
or are theoretically promising.  These approaches range from broad conceptual methods 
that keep awareness of the consequences of informality in mind when affording rights 
protections, to a variety of specific, targeted responses.    
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¶74 Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen takes a less mechanical view of development in 
arguing that freedom itself is not only the end goal of development, but also the means.185  
Because human freedom is the overarching objective, it, rather than some chosen list of 
instruments or cunning development programs, should be the central focus of 
development.186  Sen recognizes that explicit and implicit bondages in the labor market 
deny access to the free market.187  This freedom-oriented view carries traction for the 
informal economy where an inability to leave ones property to secure a formal job is just 
such an implicit bondage.  
¶75 The following are specific legal reforms that could help ensure the realization of 
human rights by keeping people within the law: an adequate minimum wage, special 
access to government programs for the traditionally discriminated against, improved 
compulsory education, literacy programs, increased access to credit for the poor, land 
reforms, and monitoring programs in economic sectors with traditionally informal 
employees, such as agriculture, and domestic work.188  Yet, for any legal reform, integrity 
is vital.  Reforms must emphasize the quality and credibility of State institutions,189 which 
will be enhanced by increasing regulatory transparency and opportunities for public input 
in the legislative and regulatory process.   
¶76 Titling programs, as previously discussed, are efforts to give the poor legal 
ownership over what they already possess.  This draws informals into the legal regime, 
provides security for assets, protects and encourages investments, ensures the ability to 
transact, grants access to formal credit, and serves as a means to increase tax revenues to 
finance infrastructure improvements.190  However, such programs also have substantial 
costs associated with potential violence, preexisting ownership, corruption, and price 
regressions.191  Yet, overall these programs have experienced some notable successes and 
offer perhaps the best chance for long-term poverty reduction and development.192  When 
titling programs are utilized, they should be implemented in ways that avoid reinforcing 
certain structural barriers, such as the marginalization of women and the poor location of 
titled lands for the poor, which impair social mobility and wealth accumulation. 193  These 
measures will help ensure that informals brought into the legal regime are able to avoid 
the exposure to disease, infrastructure failures, crime rates, etc., that they faced as 
informals.   
¶77 Microcredit programs are used to reduce poverty amongst the “poorest of the poor” 
by increasing their income and productivity through access to credit.194  The United 
Nations has noted that such programs are especially beneficial to women’s 
empowerment.195  Typical activities pursued with microcredits include small-scale 
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agriculture, manufacturing, and trade.196  For human rights purposes, microcredit 
programs can be a tool for moving extralegal activities into the formal economy. 197 
¶78 The transition to market economies in post-Communist countries presents a special 
economic case.  While these countries also need to establish sound public institutions, 
rule-of-law, and individual rights, they differ from the Third World in one important 
economic aspect, the existence of a merchant middle class.198  While this merchant 
middle class exists largely underground, it has been argued that it could be drawn into 
formality by legalizing their property rights and allowing expansion in the scope of their 
activities.199  Because transitioning economies face some different obstacles than the 
Third World, remedies should be tailored accordingly. 
¶79 A complimentary solution is offered through the human rights regime.  By ratifying 
human rights instruments, potentially powerful mechanisms are put in place for enforcing 
rights. Countries are bound to abide by domestic law and obligations from international 
treaties.  When these obligations stem from ratified human rights treaties, systematic 
failures to comply violates the rule of law, human rights, and potentially democratic 
rights as well.  Essentially, these violations reflect a right to live under a political system 
that meets its self- imposed obligations.  Utilization of the reporting and complaint 
functions contained in many human rights instruments could he lp focus increased public 
attention, both national and international, on the failure of the State to live up to its 
human rights obligations.  This would create pressure on the government to enforce their 
own laws more effectively.  Further, reporting gives a voice to people who have been 
treated as invisible and the voicing of one’s oppression can be the path to liberation. 200  
This solution is also attractive to help end the perception in much of the developing world 
that human rights instruments are “just politics.”201 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶80 This article has analyzed a vast array of human rights, and while not exhaustive, it 
has demonstrated that the informal economy is extremely problematic to enforcement of 
the human rights regime.  The danger posed by such immense extralegality is that 
international human rights instruments may be merely pie in the sky to the billions of 
people who make up the informal economy.  Even when such instruments are ratified by 
States, this provides little comfort to the intended beneficiaries existing outside of the 
legal regimes charged with implementing these rights.  To make the human rights regime 
a reality for those who need it most, they must be allowed into the formal system.  The 
question is how. 
¶81 Programs providing increased wages, government assistance, education, land 
reform, labor monitoring, and access to credit are good starts in helping the poor create 
wealth.  However, institutional reform is needed to eradicate poverty, attain development, 
and successfully transition to free market economies.  Reforms that reduce bureaucratic 
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red tape and bring the cost of legal compliance under that of extralegality are necessary to 
formalize the previously excluded.  Such reforms should also create greater regulatory 
transparency, allow for citizen input, and aim at fighting corruption and inefficiency.  
When tailored to local circumstances, titling programs that turn dead assets of the poor 
into useable capital are great tools for poverty reduction, development, and attaining legal 
inclusion for informals. 
¶82 The human rights corpus itself should be emphasized as a major part of the solution.  
The reporting functions contained within many of the human rights instruments can be 
used to generate international pressure on governments to enforce their human rights 
obligations.  Moreover, global and regional human rights courts and commissions are 
increasingly effective bodies for ensuring human rights enforcement.  Because the 
informal economy effectively interferes with the attainment of almost every significant 
human right, these bodies should assume a leading role in fighting extralegality.  The 
human rights regime does not need to be merely a victim of informality, but can also be a 
significant part of a solution that brings people within the law, alleviates poverty, and 
creates coherent legal systems. 
